

Message Text

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN PARIS
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 13093

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (CARTER, JIMMY)
SUBJ: MEETINGS WITH SAUDIS AND SADAT

1. PLEASE TELL KING HUSSEIN AND THE SHAH THAT PRESIDENT
CARTER WANTED THEM TO HAVE FOLLOWING VERY CONFIDENTIAL
REPORT ON HIS TALKS IN RIYADH AND ASWAN.

2. PRESIDENT CARTER MET WITH KING KHALID AND CROWN
PRINCE FAHD IN RIYADH ON JANUARY 3 AND WITH PRESIDENT
SADAT FOR MOST OF AN HOUR ON JANUARY 4 IN ASWAN.

3. THE PRESIDENT OUTLINED TO KING KHALID AND CROWN
PRINCE FAHD THREE BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE
SETTLEMENT: (1) UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 MUST PRE-
VAIL AS THE BASIS FOR ANY AGREEMENT; (2) ISRAEL SHOULD
WITHDRAW FROM TERRITORY OCCUPIED IN 1967; AND (3) THE
PEOPLE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA SHOULD HAVE A VOICE IN
THEIR OWN SELF-DETERMINATION. PRESIDENT SAID HE

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DETECTED SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE US POSITION AND
THE SAUDI POSITION ON SEVERAL POINTS. THE US FEELS
THAT IT MAY BE ADVISABLE TO ACCEPT SOME MINOR MODIFI-
CATIONS IN THE 1967 BORDERS IN THE INTEREST OF CONTINUED
PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS. THESE MODIFICATIONS WOULD
BE MUTUALLY NEGOTIATED AND MUST BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
TO THE PARTIES. THEY WOULD RELATE PRIMARILY TO THE

BOUNDARIES OF THE WEST BANK IN THE AREA CLOSEST TO THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA. PRESIDENT NOTED THIS POSITION WAS ACCEPTED BY KING HUSSEIN DURING THE PRIVATE TALKS IN TEHRAN AND HE WAS PASSING THIS INFORMATION IN CONFIDENCE WITH THE KING'S AUTHORIZATION. SHAH HAD ALSO ACCEPTED THIS CONCEPT.

4. PRESIDENT SAID THE US BELIEVES IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO HAVE AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN NATION ESTABLISHED BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL, WHICH WOULD BE A CONCENTRATED TARGET FOR INFLUENCE BY LIBYA, IRAQ AND OTHERS. KING KHALID RESPONDED THAT, WITH PROPER INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES, HE FELT THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE THAT MUCH ROOM FOR AGITATION. HE WONDERED IF KING HUSSEIN WOULD ACCEPT OUR VIEW ON THE DANGER OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR THE KING BUT HE BELIEVED SO IF IT WAS A NECESSARY ELEMENT ON THE PATH TO PERMANENT PEACE. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT THE KING MUST SPEAK FOR HIMSELF AND INDICATED INTEREST IN COMING TO RIYADH HIMSELF.

5. THIRD DIFFERENCE IN VIEWS OUTLINED BY PRESIDENT WAS THAT, IN A TRANSITION PERIOD, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO HAVE JOINT SUPERVISION BY JORDAN, ISRAEL AND PALESTINIANS DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. THE US PREFERS THAT THE TRANSITION PERIOD BE AS BRIEF AS
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POSSIBLE AND INCLUDE PRESENCE OF UN TROOPS OR OTHER FORCES TO GIVE CONFIDENCE TO THE PEOPLE OF THE AREA AS IT OCCURS.

6. PRESIDENT REITERATED US VIEW THAT ANY FINAL SETTLEMENT MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL, EGYPT, JORDAN, SYRIA, AND EVEN LEBANON. IT MUST BE MULTINATIONAL, EVEN THOUGH EGYPT AND ISRAEL DO THE INITIAL WORK. PRESIDENT HOPED THAT US, SAG, HUSSEIN AND SADAT COULD BE IN AGREEMENT.

7. KHALID EXPRESSED VIGOROUS SUPPORT FOR SADAT, DESPITE INITIAL SURPRISE AND IRRITATION AT NOT BEING CONSULTED. FAHD SAID HE UNDERSTOOD KING HUSSEIN'S

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POSITION. KING KHALID WONDERED IF KING HUSSEIN HAD
SHARED HIS VIEWS WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD, AND THE
PRESIDENT SAID HE DID NOT KNOW. HE NOTED, HOWEVER,
THAT HE BELIEVED KING HUSSEIN INTENDED TO CONSULT
WITH PRESIDENT SADAT PRIOR TO THE JANUARY 15 MEETINGS
IN JERUSALEM.

8. FAHD OBSERVED THAT IN EVENT OF PLEBISCITE, 80
PERCENT OF WEST BANK POPULATION WOULD OPT FOR
AFFILIATION WITH JORDAN, BUT THAT SUCH A PLEBISCITE
SHOULD BE FREE OF OUTSIDE (I.E., ISRAELI) INFLUENCE.
THEREFORE HE FELT KING HUSSEIN SHOULD NOT GET INTO
A PUBLIC POSITION OF MAINTAINING THAT THE WEST BANK
SHOULD AFFILIATE WITH JORDAN. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT
WAS CONSISTENT WITH KING HUSSEIN'S POSITION AS HE
UNDERSTOOD IT. KING WISHED TO WAIT UNTIL THE BASIC
PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATION WERE ESTABLISHED BEFORE HE
JOINED THE PROCESS. WITH REGARD TO PLEBISCITE,
PRESIDENT NOTED ISRAEL WOULD NEVER ACCEPT IF LEFT
OPEN FOR CREATION OF FULLY INDEPENDENT STATE. HOWEVER,
THEY COULD BE GIVEN FREE CHOICE BETWEEN SEVERAL
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ALTERNATIVES, E.G. AFFILIATION WITH JORDAN OR STATUS
AS A FULLY DEMILITARIZED ENTITY UNDER UN AUSPICES.

9. IN SUBSEQUENT TALKS BETWEEN SECRETARY AND FOREIGN
MINISTER SAUD, SAUD STRONGLY ENDORSED THE TWO

PRINCIPLES WHICH PRESIDENT SADAT HAD PRESENTED TO ISRAELIS IN ISMAILIA. SPECIFICALLY, HE ARGUED THAT SADAT MUST BE ABLE TO COME TO A SUMMIT OR A MEETING OF THE CONFRONTATION STATES AND ANNOUNCE THAT HE HAD OBTAINED ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES: (1) THAT ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW TO THE 1967 BORDERS; AND (2) THAT THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS WOULD BE RESPECTED, INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF RETURN AND SELF-DETERMINATION. SAUD FELT THAT EVEN AN AGREEMENT ON COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL WHICH SIMPLY CALLED FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE LINKED TO JORDAN WOULD NOT BE APPROVED BY THE ARABS. ON THE CONTRARY, A SETTLEMENT WHICH CALLED FOR WITHDRAWAL WITH MINOR MODIFICATIONS BUT WHICH INCLUDED SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS COULD NOT BE REFUSED. SECRETARY REITERATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT SELF-DETERMINATION WHICH COULD LEAD TO INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE AND SUGGESTED SEVERAL POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE IDEAS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION BUT WOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT A SETTLEMENT COULD BE AGREED BY PARTIES INVOLVED. SAUD ARGUED VIGOROUSLY AGAINST ANY ALTERNATIVES, EXPRESSING HIS FIRM BELIEF THAT ANYTHING SHORT OF FLAT AND SIMPLE EXPRESSION OF SELF-DETERMINATION WOULD RISK A BREAKDOWN WITH EXTREMELY DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR SADAT AND RADICALIZATION OF THE ARAB WORLD. US AGREED TO PONDER HIS VIEWS.

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10. IN THE BRIEF ASWAN STOP, PRESIDENT CARTER BRIEFED PRESIDENT SADAT ON HIS TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN AND OTHER LEADERS DURING HIS TRIP. HE REITERATED THAT THE US FULLY SUPPORTS THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH PRESIDENT SADAT HAD SET IN MOTION. HE SAID THAT THE US WILL PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS IN JERUSALEM, AND LATER REITERATED THAT IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT. THERE WAS AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD SERVE AS THE

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BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, IN LIGHT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN, THE SHAH AND PRESIDENT SADAT RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WAS SOME EVOLUTION IN THE PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF OUR POSITION ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IN THE PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC STATEMENT FOLLOWING THE MEETING, I.E., THAT THERE MUST BE A RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, RECOGNIZING THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND WITH PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN DETERMINING THEIR OWN FUTURE. PRESIDENT SADAT FELT THAT THERE WERE PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO THE SINAI BUT THAT THEY COULD BE RESOLVED. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO HAVE THE ARAB WORLD BEHIND WHATEVER WAS AGREED TO IN THE PRINCIPLES WHICH WERE ADOPTED TO GOVERN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

11. THIS WOULD PROVIDE THE NECESSARY BASIS FOR ENCOURAGING EXPANSION OF THE PROCESS TO INCLUDE OTHER PARTIES. THE TWO PRESIDENTS AGREED THAT EARLY PROGRESS
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IS NECESSARY, TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM.

12. THE MEETING WAS EXTREMELY FRIENDLY AND AMICABLE. PRESIDENT CARTER MENTIONED THAT BOTH KING HUSSEIN AND THE SHAH INDICATED AN INTEREST IN MEETING WITH HIM, AND PRESIDENT SADAT WELCOMED SUCH MEETINGS.
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